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Abstract
This paper uses the concepts of means of innovation and modes of innovation to introduce
an alternative approach to the understanding of the evolution of the South African system of
innovation.  Modes of innovation are defined in terms of ownership and control patterns of
the means of innovation, as well as the role played by human capital.  The relationship
between ideology and modes of innovation is briefly examined.  This paper lays the basis for
an alternative approach to the analysis of the transition of South Africa’s economic structure
from apartheid to democracy and of the rifts and continuities in that transition.  
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Introduction 
The history of the political economy of South Africa is for the most part one of
colonialism and the post-colonial system of apartheid.  It is certainly a history that
has disenfranchised the majority of the country’s population for all but the last fifteen
years.  It is also a history whose peculiarities have formed the essential shape of the
South African system of innovation.  This is a shape that has not significantly
changed since the end of apartheid, primarily because of the adoption of the
neoliberal paradigm as the conceptual base for the first economic plan of the new
democracy - the Growth, Employment and Reconstruction programme (GEAR).  
Concurrent to the launch of GEAR, another plan, the 1996 White Paper on
Science and Technology, introduced a systems of innovation approach to economic
planning. Initially, this approach was severely curtailed by the overarching planning
framework of GEAR but as disillusionment grew with overall economic performance,
and in particular with the inability to effect the required structural transformation of
the economy, a more strategic approach to economic planning has slowly emerged. 
However, even though there is now a widespread disillusionment with the neoliberal
paradigm, both locally and globally, economic planning in South Africa is still caught
up in a neoliberal language framework.  Consequently, the various attempts to
address the recognised shortfalls of GEAR have been fragmented and lacking in an
alternative unifying informing conceptual framework.  
Over the short period of time since 1996, the systems of innovation approach has
certainly gained ascendance within the sphere of science, technology and innovation
(STI) planning in the sense that it has enlarged the sphere of STI planning to engage
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with other related areas of national policy.  It has now laid the foundations for a more
integrated approach to STI planning.  There is however a scope to the systems of
innovation approach which extends beyond STI planning and which can provide the
conceptual foundation for an integrated planning framework to replace GEAR.  The
basis for this conceptual shift rests on a broad definition of innovation which
essentially equates the national system of innovation to the economy.  With the
adoption of this approach we bring in the notion of specificity and the study of history
as determining the specificity of systems to the fore of economic analysis.  
In this paper I explore the concept of “modes of innovation” as the foundation for
an evolutionary approach to economic historiography and to the understanding of
national systems of innovation.  In the sections which follow I first define the concept
and its basis on a specific definition of innovation and on a particular definition of
human capital.  I then link the concept with national systems of innovation through a
discussion of the role of ideology and the shifting meaning of sovereignty.  Finally, I
look at the evolution of the South African system of innovation from this approach.
Modes of innovation
There are a number of perspectives from which we may approach a definition of
innovation broad enough to encompass all alterations in human activity which
represent within specific contexts a, real or perceived, “better practice”.  The
Schumpeterian definition of innovation focusses on the firm’s strategy to alter its
competitive advantage (Schumpeter, 1934).  March and Simon (1993), and
Williamson (1985) offer a behavioural and organisational explanation of the sources
of innovation.  This has been extended considerably by Lundvall’s (see Lundvall,
1996) substitution of the “learning” economy for the “knowledge” economy as a
means to shift the study of systems of innovation firmly to the analysis of dynamic
systems.  Johnson (1988) and, obliquely, North (1990) bring in the broader
institutional framework and institutional change as an integral element in the analysis
of dynamic systems.  From yet a different angle, Lancaster’s rearticulation of the
orthodox neoclassical theory of consumption (Lancaster, 1966a, 1966b), as
consisting of a multitude of, often apparently disparate, activities which serve
complex combinations of consumer desire, opens up yet another perspective of the
meaning and sources of innovation.  The combination of these broad perspectives
on the meaning of innovation can therefore expand the term to cover all changes
within dynamic systems.  We can go further than this, however, and propose that
from the premise of this definition of innovation the value of all production and
economic activity may be seen as the embodiment of past streams of innovation. 
This form the basis of what we may call an innovation theory of value.  The source of
innovation, mediated as it may be through institutions but also including institutional
change, is closely linked to human capital from which all innovation ultimately derives
and its counterpart would be a human capital theory of value.  Again, there are
numerous contentious definitions of this concept, and these will be further explored
further on.  Moreover, while human capital, in its various facets, is an input measure,
innovation is a measure of the outcome of the deployment of human capital and
other inputs within complex institutional frameworks.  
The means of innovation include human capital, machines, tools, plant and
equipment, and infrastructure which are combined in production and economic
activity and reflect current and past streams of innovation.  If we use Marxist
terminology, as we should, given that the conceptual basis for this paper is
essentially Marxist, we can use the term “forces of innovation” as an alternative. 
This would however imply a significant departure from the analogy with “forces of
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production” since it would include both human and non-human means of innovation,
whereas Marxist analysis distinguishes quite clearly between labour and the material
means of production. As a stock and a flow concept, the means of innovation
capture both the innovation embodied in economic activity and the streams of
innovation which are at the heart of dynamic systems.  The distinction between the
human and the non-human means of innovation is crucial because it directly affects
the patterns of the ownership of and the control over the means of innovation.  It also
allows for the analysis of the generation of a surplus over and above the returns to
the human means of innovation.  The patterns of control over the means of
innovation normally derive from three sources.  These are control over one’s own
human capital, control of the non-human means of innovation and control of the
coordinating mechanisms and institutions that determine the “innovation production
function”.  In none of these cases does control necessarily equate to ownership.  The
possible combinations of the means of innovation and the ownership and control
structures which bring them together define the modes of innovation.  This concept
can be used to classify shifts in the evolution and the “development stages” of
systems of innovation.  
Within the context of the national system of innovation, the different modes of
innovation are defined by the combination of two core characteristics.  These are the
patterns of ownership and control of the means of innovation, and the rates, spread
and types of human capital investment that are required to reproduce the specific
mode.  The combination of these two categories of parameters determines the
power configuration of different modes of innovation.  The evolutionary forces
inherent in dynamic systems would be the source of the shift from one mode of
innovation to another, but different modes of innovation can exist within the same
system of innovation and the relationship between them would provide another
defining feature of the national system of innovation.  Modes of innovation are
fundamentally dynamic and can be further defined by the institutional tension
between innovation and conservation.  Systems are thus in a perpetual state of flux
and apparently static systems are those where the forces for innovation and
conservation are temporarily balanced, giving the appearance of stability.  
Within this approach, the concept of an innovation theory of value proposes that
the value of output is defined by the streams of innovation that have gone into its
production and into all inputs that are used in production.  This concept differs from
that of a labour theory of value in that it shifts the notion of value away from the
general category of labour to that of human capital and the innovative capacity of
labour.  The second distinction is the shift of emphasis away from production to
knowledge.  Moreover, the object of the analysis of control and ownership also shifts
from tangibles to knowledge.  Once knowledge and innovation become immanent
across the economy, it no longer makes sense to talk of the “knowledge economy”
as representing a special case in the history of the evolution of economic systems. 
Once an innovation theory of value is adopted an economy is necessarily a
knowledge economy and the rupture represented by the current common use of the
terms would rather be captured by shifts affecting the speed and paths of innovation,
the altered demands on the generation of human capital and altered patterns of the
control and ownership of the means of innovation. The means of innovation are
closely related to technological capabilities, defined as the ability to absorb, adapt
and create innovation but they also include the determinants of technological
capabilities, those institutional factors that promote, shape and deploy technological
capabilities.  
In terms of classification, the post-Enlightenment period can be divided into three
stages which are associated with different predominant modes of innovation. 
However, although these stages are presented as chronological, any of the
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associated modes can and often do exist concurrently within most systems.  The first
stage is the early industrial period characterised by the owner/manager “captain of
industry”.  This period, spanning from the beginning of the industrial revolution to the
last part of the 19  century, was marked by radical innovations and techno-economicth
paradigm shifts which altered the foundations of the economy but with were still
widely separated over time.  Freeman and Perez (1988) show how different techno-
economic paradigm shifts within this long period were linked to technological
revolutions in core materials and transport.  This period also marked the introduction
of standardised production, division of labour and economies of large scale
production. This was also the stage which, in a historically unprecedented manner,
was marked by a heavy dependence on natural resources.  The initial voyages of
conquest and the start of the age of western imperial power combined with the
nascence of the industrial revolution were driven by the need to control the supply of
natural resources across the globe. The proletarisation of labour did require an
investment in skills but the demand for broad based skills levels was generally low
and static.  Human capital formation and reproduction mostly occurred via non-
formal institutions such as apprenticeships.  In this stage the predominant means of
innovation at any point were largely non-human and successive technological
breakthroughs did not normally require an accompanying quantum leap in the skills
base of the labour force or much of an increase in the rate of investment in human
capital.  Consequently, during this stage the combination of a high degree of
lumpiness of capital and technology and relatively low requirements of broad based
skills resulted in a high level of concentration of both the ownership and the control
of the means of innovation. 
The second mode of innovation is that of mature industrialisation which reached
its epitome after the Second World War.  Its main distinguishing feature was the
progressive separation between the ownership and the control of the means of
innovation.  With the diffusion of equity, control shifts to the new technocracy and the
principal-agent problem with the possibility of divergent objectives arises.  To a large
extent this was caused by the increasing capital requirements of new technologies
within a context of a growing frequency of radical innovations and techno-economic
paradigm shifts.  The demand for broad based technological capabilities and the
necessary higher rates of human capital investment also increased.  Within this
mode, the process of human capital formation and reproduction was increasingly
formalised through schooling systems encompassing primary and secondary
schools, technical colleges and higher education institutions.  Simultaneously, with
the separation of management from ownership, a new managerial class was
developed and scientific management was introduced with Taylorism and Fordism in
the early part of the twentieth century.    This was the age of ever larger production
runs in a global economy whose core feature was an apparently inexhaustible supply
of cheap energy.  This exerted an upward push on wages marked by a progressive
shift in the global division of labour with heavy natural resource/low skills based
industry moving out to the global periphery.  The power of capital within this mode
was tempered by organised labour and by heavily regulated political economies
within a Keynesian macroeconomic policy framework.  At the same time the war had
ushered in big science with the initial public investments in R&D leading to a wide
range of commercial applications and this heralded the emergence of the third stage.
The third mode of innovation is that of the post-industrial knowledge economy
whose defining feature was the microelectronics revolution.  This is characterised by
the shift of the economy away from manufacturing to services and from long batch
production to shorter lines with ICT enabled design pervading most manufactured
product lines.  The frequency of radical innovations and techno-economic paradigm
shifts is historically unprecedented with the consequent rapidly changing
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requirements of new sets of technological capabilities.  There is the dawn of new
techno-economic paradigms with biotechnology and nanotechnology indicating
coming structural shifts in production and cost structures and the emergence of new
economies of scale and scope.  The global division of labour is further differentiated
with economies being distinguished by the predominance of specific modes of
innovation.  This mode of innovation is also associated with globalisation and the
integration of global markets in a manner dictated by the neoliberal/neoclassical
ideal.  However, globalisation is not a necessary condition for this mode to emerge.  
The new human capital requirement of the post-industrial mode of innovation
represents a radical shift from the relatively linear progression in the earlier two
modes.  This mode sees the disappearance of lifetime jobs or even careers,
professions and trade.  It requires an ongoing personal investment in own human
capital, an ever expanding learning capacity and multi-skilling, translated as the
requirement to shift skills bases rapidly in response to the ever accelerating rate of
change, be it technological or institutional.  There is also a shift in the onus of human
capital investment away from the state to the individual as university subsidies are
reduced in favour of student loans and with industry increasingly demanding “job
ready” graduates.  
The implications for the ownership and control patterns of the means of innovation
are complex.  On the one hand, there is a quantum leap in own investment in human
capital by individuals combined with a proliferation of economic sectors where the
lumpiness of other means of innovation has been dramatically reduced.  On the
other hand, the global integration of markets has led to a high degree of
concentration of employers engaging with globally competing “knowledge workers”. 
Thus, while the individual ownership of the means of innovation has increased
substantially there is a countervailing increase in the monopsonistic power of
international capitalism.  This complexity is compounded by the fact that the
ownership of the non-human means of production at any point in time is widely
dispersed among a vast pool of anonymous shareholders, which also includes all
knowledge workers.  The control of the non-human means of innovation is now
totally divorced from ownership and lies with the new technocratic class. 
Globalisation and the emergence of neoliberalism due to the economic crises of the
1970s have also shifted the balance of power between capital and labour.  As
regulation, and the enforcement of regulation, withered away and capital became
internationally fluid and able to source cheap labour from across the globe, the
power of nation-based organised labour has been significantly eroded.
National systems of innovation can therefore be classified by identifying the
dominant mode of innovation and by assessing the degree of convergence of modes
of innovation within the system.  The combination of these two factors determines
the evolutionary path of national systems of innovation.  A system of innovation is
defined as a network of institutions (formal and informal) within which innovation
occurs.  It may also be seen as a configuration of modes of innovation with complex
sets of institutional relationships within and between the various modes present in a
specified system.  Systems can therefore range from a uniformity of modes, with an
overarching mode of innovation, to a diversity of modes, with various modes
coexisting within the same system.  The nature of that coexistence, the nature of the
linkages among different modes of innovation within the same national system of
innovation, provides a scope for the reinterpretation of various concerns of
underdevelopment.  Such concerns would include phenomena such as dual and
enclave economies, the rural-urban divides, and the possibility of a strong system of
science and technology existing within an underdeveloped national system of
innovation.
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In the process of the classification of national systems of innovation on the basis
of modes of innovation, two interrelated questions arise which directly address the
political economy foundations of the national system of innovation.  The first issue is
the relationship between ideology and specific modes of innovation.  The second is
the relationship between the national system of science and technology and the
national system of innovation.  Before we get into that, however, we need to examine
further the pivotal role played by human capital in the shift from one mode of
innovation to another.  Skills and the more generalised, and possibly ephemeral,
concept of human capital are the ultimate source of innovation and, more than other
factors, determine the enabling factor and at the same time the major constraint in
the transition from one mode of innovation to another.  It is therefore opportune to
look a bit more closely at the nature and determinants of human capital.
Human capital
Unlike skills, the precise definition of human capital is difficult since it tends to go to
the essence of the human condition. More than problem solving abilities which are
shared by a number of other creatures, especially primates, it refers to the ability to
formulate problems, to invent new questions and in the process to alter the human
condition.  Narrowly, it can be defined as knowledge, both tacit and codified, that is
embedded in human beings and the ability to apply that knowledge to the production
of goods and services.  Tacit knowledge, the foundation of the propensity for
learning, is developed primarily through specific cultural practices of problem solving
and formulation.  Its development is complex and long-term and it is specifically this
aspect of human capital development that makes it such a costly long-term
investment process.  It is costly because it requires a large diversity of inputs whose
supply must be guaranteed and secure over time.  It is also a fragile process since
human capital deteriorates unless there is continuous investment and it can
disintegrate when the institutional underpinning of tacit knowledge is severely
damaged, as is the case in times of political upheaval and war. 
The usage of the concept of human capital within the context of systems of
innovation requires that the term be explicitly defined.  Within this analytical
framework the definition of human capital is far removed from the neoclassical full
information optimising model of human behaviour.  This rightly draws a Marxist
critique on a number of levels, especially in its commodification of labour, its
exclusion of social formation and power, and its inference that in “competitive”
markets labour is paid the equivalent of its marginal revenue product.   From the1
perspective of innovation theory, human capital is assumed to be a less than
perfectly known composite datum, including social capital, which is relatively open to
a multitude of determinants.  Human capital formation is similarly a process which is
not subject to full specification.  It is a social process which also serves to reinforce
existing power relations through socialisation and the internalisation of norms and
values.  It is a complex process, both overt as in the explicit skills transmission of
education and covert as is the case with the more subtle forms of socialisation, which
has to be contextualised in space and time in order to allow an understanding of its
specificities.  The introduction of this concept also allows for an engagement with the
heterogeneity of labour and the different abilities of the different fractions of wage
earners to reduce the surplus value of their work that would have been appropriated
by capital.
 See Bowles and Gintis (1975) for an extensive coverage of the Marxist critique of
1
neoclassical human capital theory.
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From a system of innovation perspective, human capital is possibly the foremost
public good whose provision determines the evolutionary path of national systems of
innovation.  It essentially a public good in that its returns cannot be appropriated
entirely by any single individual, who owns it, buys it or rents it.  It is subject to large
potential externalities, where only a small portion of its returns can be captured by
the individual and that portion is far outweighed by the returns to the economy as a
whole.  However, human capital formation without the corresponding institutional
setting is not necessarily conducive to public welfare.  The articulation between the
human capital formation process and the skills requirements of the economy is
essential to avoid the brain and skills drain from developing to industrialised
economies that is endemic in a number of countries.   Secondly, without the2
appropriate employment conditions, human capital may translate into antisocial
activity in the form of organised crime and widespread corruption.  Finally, if human
capital formation falls below specific thresholds it will be impossible to reproduce its
base, let alone develop it.  The returns on human capital will then tend to be mainly
private with little or no spillovers to the economy at large.  
Human capital is a complex phenomenon.  Its formation is the resultant of a
convergence of various elements which include education, health, secure basic
needs provision and a secure base of social capital.  If we stray momentarily into
neoclassical language we could say that human capital formation is a production
process with several inputs that can be combined in different ways to produce a
complex output.  From within this language we can say that the marginal productivity,
or the effectiveness, of any single input is highly dependent on the other inputs. 
Thus, for example, the effectiveness of public spending on education, its marginal
productivity, is positively and strongly correlated with the availability of the other
inputs.    
Human capital development is the result of a long term investment process
requiring a stable guaranteed environment.  The extent of the outlay on this long
term investment, combined with its high externalities content requires state
intervention on a wide front which covers much more than education.  The long-term
nature of this investment requires a set of stability conditions that would guarantee
long term planning horizons.  While the specifics of the location of human capital
formation is often contingent on cultural, political and economic factors, it is generally
the family unit, however that is defined, which is the main formative context for
human capital.  The stability conditions of the average family would therefore have to
be guaranteed and protected from the vagaries of economic fluctuations in order to
protect the source of this, the most important economic resource.  From this
perspective a welfare system that guarantees adequate housing, health care, food
and education should be seen not only a right of the country’s citizens but also as a
basic requirement for the country’s development.  
If we analyse human capital formation from a reductionist economic viewpoint, we
may say that this public good is one whose production has been privatised in its
location within the family unit.  The focus then shifts to the degree of privatisation.  In
most countries the rights of parents over the rearing of children are severely
circumscribed.  Laws against child labour, mandatory education laws and laws
against the sexual abuse of children are all limitations on the power of parents over
children and these institutions determine the context within which the family performs
its role as the producer of human capital.  Furthermore, we can propose, again using
the production analogy, that the less the fiscal support of the state, the more costly it
is for the family to perform this function and hence the less likely it is to perform it. 
An “absent state” in this area will result in human capital formation becoming more of
a private good, belonging to the privileged few since human capital formation is too
  South Africa has been experiencing a steady net skills drain since 1994 (Kraak, 2004).
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costly a process for all but the wealthiest families to bear and certainly much too
costly, given the externalities, to be provided by the private sector.  The responsibility
for a country’s human capital formation thus lies fundamentally with the state.  
The ideological implications of modes of innovation
The relationship between the ideological base of any specific political economy and
the dominant mode of innovation in that economy is to a large extent dependent on
the diffusion patterns of the ownership and control of the means of innovation. 
These, as I have argued are closely and causally linked to the mode of innovation. 
Another factor that enters into the relationship between ideology and the mode of
innovation is the relationship between systems of innovation and systems of science
and technology.  There is a body of theory and empirical research that indicates a
positive relationship between democracy and technological innovation (see Coccia,
2008).  However, a historical analysis of the South African system of innovation
indicates that a non-democratic and overtly racist political economy may actually
have promoted the development of a sophisticated system of science and technology
while at the same time seriously compromising the evolution of the national system
of innovation.  This apparent contradiction is the problematic that may be addressed
by a “modes of innovation” approach, specifically if we consider the concurrent
existence of different modes of innovation within the same national system of
innovation.
In the case of the diffusion of ownership the post industrial mode of innovation with
its heavy knowledge and learning requirements would be best served by a political
economic base that is democratic, both legally and economically.  The distinction
between the two types of democracy is important since each can exist without the
other.  Constitutional democracies can, and frequently are, marked by high levels of
inequalities in income, wealth and life opportunities.  In such cases the ownership of
the means of innovation is highly concentrated and path dependency can prove a
major impediment to the transition from one system of innovation to another.  On the
other hand, some political economies which are constitutional one-party states can
often exhibit a greater levelling of the access of individuals to the individual
ownership of the means of production and the appropriation of the returns on such
ownership.  
The early industrialisation mode, with its relatively low broad based skills
requirements, is often comfortably served by a political economy whose ideological
base is, at least from an economic perspective, non-democratic.  The shift to the late
industrialisation mode puts a greater pressure for at least an economically
democratic political economy to emerge, since the increased requirement for a broad
skills base implies a higher degree of the diffusion of the ownership of the means of
production.  This in turn implies a higher degree of equality in income, wealth and life
chances.  
The other relationship that has a bearing on the ideological base is the relationship
between the system of science and technology and that of innovation. While the
broad definition of innovation conceptually requires the necessity of the existence of
systems of innovation, there is no such necessity for the existence of systems of
science and technology.  While systems of innovation exist, those of science and
technology have to be created.   It is therefore possible to think of the possibility of
stable and healthy systems of innovation that have a poorly developed system of
science and technology.  The main requirement for this combination is the spread of
the ownership of the means of innovation that is associated with a high degree of
economic equality.  The opposite is also true.  One can have a strong system of
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science and technology within a poorly developed system of innovation with low
evolutionary prospects.  This is often the case in the case of predatory states where
the oppressed form the majority of the population and which therefore have high
concentrations of ownership and control of the means of innovation.  In this case the
historical context is also significant since the global acceptance or rejection of such
regimes depends on the time and determines to some extent the national investment
in science and technology.
The relationship between modes of innovation and ideologies is mediated through
a discourse on power.  This discourse is shaped by two main characteristics.  The
first is a two-way direction of causality between knowledge and power.  Knowledge
endows its owner or controller with power but power also determines the direction of
emerging knowledge.  Herein lies the imperative for institutions to reproduce, grow
and perpetuate themselves.   Secondly, a lá Marx and ironically Schumpeter, the
innovation process is essentially dialectical in that every knowledge system and
system of innovation with the associated political economy contains within itself the
inherent contradictions which lead to the possibility of its eventual destruction.  The
main concern with the post-apartheid system of innovation is whether or not it
constitutes a rupture with the pre-democratic system.  That system, built as it was
over forty odd years of progressively isolated siege economy not only gave rise to a
sophisticated and idiosyncratic system of science and technology but also deeply
entrenched an early industrial mode of innovation as the predominant one.  The late
industrial mode of innovation only started emerging towards the second half of the
apartheid era but is still placed within a context of low levels of human capital and
high degrees of inequality.  The proof of rupture can therefore only be found in
evidence of a shift in the dominant mode of innovation.
The question of sovereignty
Up to this point, this discussion on modes of innovation and their relationship with the
national system of innovation has proceeded under the implicit assumption of
autarky.  If we bring in the relationship of the national system of innovation to the
global economy, a further dimension, another level of complexity, is added to the
analysis of national systems of innovation.  Globalisation has certainly affected the
integrity of national systems of innovation, in the sense that it has rendered the
national delimiters of such systems hazy and has significantly reduced the ability of
nation states to shape the evolution of their systems of innovation.  However, not all
national systems are equally placed within the topography of what we may call the
globalised system of innovation.  In this respect it is history that determines this
placing, this degree of economic sovereignty that defines the degree of the self
determination of national systems of innovation and their power placing relative to
other national systems.  
 We may trace this history in the transition from the age of imperialism, through
the post-colonial period, to what, following Hardt and Negri (2000), we may call the
age of Empire that was ushered in with globalisation.  In terms of economic power,
most modern economies may be classified as formerly colonisers or colonised. 
From the perspective of systems of innovation we may see the transition from the
colonial to the post colonial period as one which saw the legal perimeters of the
former colonial powers shrinking and the emergence of new, legally defined, national
systems of innovation.  The post-colonial period also saw the enduring links, both
economic and cultural, of the newly decolonised national systems of innovation to the
former coloniser.  The various policy prescriptions adopted by the former colonies
determined to a large extent the degree to which the sovereignty of the new national
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systems of innovation was established and the placing of specific national systems
within the new globalised era.  The shift into Empire, tied as it was with globalisation,
the post-industrial mode of innovation and the apparent corporate denationalisation,
brought about a reconfiguration of the concentrations of economic power and new
loci of economic sovereignty.  Those formerly colonised economies which eventually
became the success stories of post-war development saw a progressive increase in
the sovereignty of their national systems of innovation from the shift to independence
to their emergence into the list of global corporate power in the age of Empire.  The
clearest example of this class is provided by most of the Asian Tigers, with the
relatively recent emergence of India as a global economic power.  Others, notably in
Latin America, have, since the nineties, achieved an increasing degree of self-
determination over the evolution of their systems of innovation.  Sub-Saharan Africa,
in general, shows little signs of economic sovereignty.  
The case of South Africa is an exception in two distinct ways.  The first, which is
commonly observed, is the fact that, in terms of the sophistication of its physical and
institutional infrastructure, it is the only modern economy within the region with a well
developed physical and institutional infrastructure.  In this sense it is the source of a
strong asymmetry in the configuration of economic power in the region and is
simultaneously the main source of intra-African foreign direct investment and
destination of substantial flows of human capital from the rest of the continent.  
The second distinct feature of the evolution of the South African system of
innovation is the path of its various transitions.  The formation of the Union of South
Africa in 1910 saw the start of a transition into the post-colonial stage that saw
political power and sovereignty shifting to an indigenous white (Afrikaner) minority. 
The odd feature of this phase was that the large majority of the population was
excluded from a democratic participation in the new political economy under an
overtly racist political regime.  Otherwise the South African system of innovation
retained strong economic links with the former colonial power.  The contradictions of
this situation gave rise to its labelling as “colonialism of a special type” or “internal
colonialism” to try to capture the coexistence of an indigenous advanced capitalist
economy with the legislated disenfranchisement of the indigenous majority of the
population.   The inter-war period saw the rapid industrialisation of the South African3
economy catalysed by state intervention on a number of fronts.  The establishment of
apartheid in 1948 and the exclusion of South Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961
ushered in a period of an increasing political and economic isolation of the South
African national system of innovation.  This period saw a progressive diffusion of the
economic links with the formal colonial power and at the same time laid the
foundations for a rapid development of the South African system of science and
technology with the rapid emergence of the military-industrial-complex. 
Concurrently, however, the implementation of apartheid legislation, especially those
parts which affected the various aspects of broad based human capital development,
progressively impoverished the South African system of innovation, especially in
relation to the systems of innovation emerging in the post colonial world.
The official end of apartheid marked by the 1994 elections brought in an urgent
need to transform the national system of innovation.  The failure to do so was partly
responsible for the flight of most of the foremost corporations out of a country which
had suddenly become a legitimate part of globalized capital.  This was a perverse
result of democracy.  Corporate power had evolved within the specific conditions of
the South African political economy since 1910 and had transmuted into a non-
ethnically defined white owned capital base during apartheid.  Towards the last
decade of apartheid the increasing isolation of the South African economy generated
an incremental cost to South African corporations.  Moreover, the deteriorating
  See W olpe (1988: 61-63) for a discussion of this concept.
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human capital base severely constrained the economy’s transition to the post-
industrial mode of innovation.  The end of apartheid suddenly made South African
corporate power globally legitimate and mobile and this enabled the exodus of
corporations towards economic centres.  Thus, again perversely, we have seen a
degradation of the South African system of innovation back to a post-colonial stage
with the core of corporate planning, decision making and R&D activity taking place in
the “North” and lower value-adding operations located within South Africa.  
The South African case
At the turn of the (20 ) century the South African system of innovation wasth
dominated by the early industrial mode.  The economy was mostly based on mining
and ancillary industries, and agriculture.  The skilled labour requirements of the
economy were those that were associated with mining and mostly quite specific to
mining technology.  Moreover, the ownership of most of the mining houses was
British and foreign.  The country’s first Science and Technology plan was part of the
initiative that was running through the British Empire, driven by the crisis created by
the First World War.   4
The first concerted drive for industrialisation in the manufacturing sector came in
the inter-war period and interestingly enough the foremost large scale initiative, in the
steel industry was driven by a state established enterprise.  The case made for this
intervention was explicitly that of market failure (Scerri, 2009: Ch. 3).  The state also
set up an extensive rail transport network which added a further stimulus to the
expansion of the manufacturing sector.  One of the consequences of this drive was
the increasingly diversified skills requirements, especially in engineering and tool
making, away from those which were specific to mining.  The Second World War
provided a further massive stimulus to the expansion of the South African
manufacturing sector.  Until this period the political economy of South Africa was not
markedly different from that of other, settler colonial economies within the Empire.  It
was overtly racist with ownership, employment and residential rights defined by race
but this was the common feature of the colonies, even if the Union of South Africa
with an Afrikaner dominated government had its specific characteristics.  Within this
context South Africa’s system of innovation was evolving in line with the rest of the
Empire.
However, the end of the war and the onset of apartheid shunted the evolution of
the South African system of innovation on to a different path right at the dawn of the
post colonial era.  The two immediate concerns of the apartheid regime were the
interpenetration, and hence the homogenisation, of Afrikaner and English capital and
the institutionalisation of a unique type of racial capitalism.  The simple fact that the
disenfranchised made up the majority of the population froze the South African
system of innovation into a particular mix of an early industrial mode of innovation
alongside an emerging late industrialisation mode.  This mix became entrenched,
cumulative and path dependent to the extent that it formed the basis for the late post-
apartheid presidential description of the South African economy fifty years later as
the mix of two distinct and separate nations – the “first and the second economies”. 
It was also a system that lacked the basic prerequisite for the transition from a late
industrial to the post industrial mode of innovation.  
At the same time the increasing international isolation and the anti-apartheid
movement promoted the emergence of a siege economy and the rapid growth of the
  This was the only national S&T plan ever drafted in South Africa before the 1996 W hite
4
Paper on Science and Technology.  The plan and the agencies that it established were
abandoned shortly after the First W orld W ar (see Scerri, 2009: Ch 3).
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military-industry-complex.  This development was typically highly conducive to the
development of the country’s system of science and technology.  The establishment
of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in the mid-forties laid the
basis for the institutional base for this system.  Perceived military dictates pushed
scientific and technological breakthroughs on a number of fronts, including synthetic
fuels, nuclear and missile technology, electronics and guidance systems, and
materials technologies.  This development was against the backdrop of an unskilled
and deskilled labour force and generally poor supplies of human capital.  It was
stamped by a structural and endemic inequality in income, wealth and life chances, a
structure which was cumulative and path dependent and determined the fundamental
nature of the national system of innovation inherited by the post-apartheid political
economy.  This particular evolution path of the South African system of innovation
was in contrast to a global environment where the transition to the knowledge (and
learning) economy was fundamentally predicated on the plentiful availability of highly
skilled, and multi-skilled, labour which is in a perpetual learning and adaptive mode,
ready to respond to the shifting demands of a rapidly accelerating technology
environment.  
The South African system of innovation had been built on the basis of an
institutionalised (formal under apartheid and informal thereafter) exploitation and
subjugation of the vast majority of the population.  Through numerous pieces of
legislation on education  it had deprived the labour force of most its ability to invest in5
its own human capital.  This was the effect of numerous pieces of legislation which
affected education, job access, and rights of residence.  Not only were the direct
determinants of education affected, but the integrity and the support for the family
unit as the incubator of human capital were also seriously compromised.  The
ownership and control patterns of the means of innovation within the South African
system of innovation were to be identified with the early industrial mode of innovation
and the dominant industrial structure in the South African economy until the end of
apartheid was still firmly set within this mode.  
Wolpe (1980, 1989) argued that the group areas act which moved a substantial
portion of the black  population to townships, homelands and bantustans  effectively6 7
shifted the responsibility of the reproduction of labour power, or, in terms of this
paper, human capital away from the private sector and the state to the family unit. 
The fundamental structure of apartheid could not allow for the upward mobility of the
black population and this entrenched the consequent dominant early industrial mode
of innovation.  The human capital reproduction system which was an integral part of
apartheid was also fundamental to the reproduction of this mode.  The ensuing
preponderance of the non-human means of innovation within the national system of
innovation also resulted in high concentrations of the ownership and control patterns
of the means of innovation within the system.
  Amendments to the Bantu Education Act in 1954, 1956, 1959 and 1961; the Coloured
5
Peoples Act of 1963; the Indians' Education Act of 1965; Extension of University Education Act
of 1959
 The term “black” is here used in the political and not the biological sense to represent all
6
population groups disenfranchised by apartheid.
 Four “independent” bantustans were created along ethnic lines.  These were Transkei
7
(Xhosa), declared independent on the 26  October 1976, Bophuthatswana (Tswana), declaredth
independent on the 6  December 1977, Venda (Venda), declared independent on the 13th th
September 1979, and Ciskei (also Xhosa), declared independent on the 4  December 1981. th
 The other six homelands - Gazankulu (Tsonga [Shangaan]), KaNgwane (Swazi), KwaNdebele
(Ndebele), KwaZulu (Zulu), Lebowa (Northern Sotho or Pedi) and QwaQwa (Southern Sotho) -
were assigned partial administrative autonomy.  The several townships were created to house
a permanent black labour force as “foreigners” within a “white” South Africa. 
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The post apartheid system of innovation was determined, virtually at its inception
by the neoliberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) economic plan
that was put into legislation in 1996.  This plan, drafted at the zenith of the global
acceptance and advocacy of neoliberalism as the only viable model of economic
coordination, was premised on the assumption that the growth of the private sector
would, through the “trickle down” effect, benefit the whole economy and address the
inequalities entrenched by apartheid.  Its critics maintained that the withdrawal of the
state from the option of strategic intervention meant that there would be a structural
continuity with the apartheid economy.   In fact, the old structure would be reinforced8
since its legitimacy would be established with the end of apartheid.  Thirteen years
after the plan was put into effect, there is no doubt that not only did the plan not
deliver on its promised growth rates but that it dismally failed to address the
employment and redistribution parts of its promise.  In terms of the language used in
this paper the plan failed to alter the dominant mode of innovation in South Africa. 
Indeed it could not do so, almost by definition.  
The failure of post-apartheid economic planning to create a definitive break in the
evolution of the national system of innovation was threefold.  The first, which was a
direct consequence of the informing economic paradigm, was the drive to the
liberalisation of markets and the abjuration of strategic intervention.  It is difficult to
see how this could have altered the inherited economic structure since it is rarely the
business of business to alter the overall economic structure within which it operates. 
It is rather the function of the state to alter structure and to change the rules of the
game within which private enterprises operate.  The inter-sectoral relations inherited
from apartheid, based as they were on the assumption of a generally low skills base
and relatively cheap capital could not possibly be changed without an informed
programme of strategic intervention designed to alter inter-sectoral price ratios.  The
one systemic effect of the liberalisation programme was the impact of trade
liberalisation which proceeded at a rate that was even faster than that required by the
WTO.   9
The second case of failure was in those areas of state intervention that were
aimed at directly altering the inequities of apartheid.  Within the context of GEAR,
state intervention was to be neutral and restricted to the provision of basic needs,
such as housing, water, energy, health and education to households, which would
raise the human capital base of the economy but which, because of its high
externalities content, would not be provided by the private sector.  However, there is
an acknowledgement that the state has largely failed to execute this mandate both in
terms of the actual levels of provision of basic needs and because of the
countervailing impact of the liberalisation of markets such as transport and staple
food.  This liberalisation has seen the costs of the privately owned transport sector
and the cost of staple food items rocketing and in effect imposing a regressive form
of effective tax on the poor.
The third failure was in the redress of the disastrous spatial economics of
apartheid.  The redrawing of the provincial map of South Africa after apartheid should
have aimed at creating sound local systems of innovations which, while different
  See Adelzadeh (1996) for an orthodox economic critique of GEAR.8
  Lall (1993) argued that the tariff system under apartheid was perverted in that it protected
9
mature industries with limited potential for technological advance while exposing emerging
industries with a high technology potential to international competition.  From this perspective,
trade liberalisation would have removed the distortion effects of tariffs.  However, the rapid
removal of protection for labour intensive low skilled industries such as textiles and clothing
caused the collapse of specific sectors and an increase in unemployment.  Of course the more
appropriate policy would have been to re-draw the tariff regime on the basis of some version
of the “infant industry” argument.
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because of different nodes of core competencies a competitive advantage would
have laid a sound basis for a convergence within the national system of innovation. 
Instead the effect of history distorted the new economic geography to the extent that
dramatic differences in the performance of the various provinces have led to a self-
perpetuating and self-reinforcing path of divergence (see Scerri, 2008).  
South Africa may now well be at the threshold of a possible break in the evolution
of its system of innovation.  This is due to a combination of three factors.  The first is
the long simmering and widening acceptance of the failure of the GEAR programme
to achieve its stated goals.  This forms the first basis of a policy equivalent of a
Kuhnian paradigm shift.  The second is the recent reconfiguration of the ruling party
with organised labour and the South African Communist Party in the ascendance. 
The third is the global disillusionment with neoliberal economics which has spread
dramatically with the onset of the global financial crisis.  These are the preconditions
for a definitive rupture in the evolution of the South African system of innovation. 
What is now needed for its coming into being is the introduction of an alternative
planning coordination paradigm.
Conclusion
This paper hopefully provides an initial articulation of a novel approach to the
understanding of systems of innovation, an approach which subscribes to a broadly
Marxist analysis.  If it is theoretically coherent, it will still have to be assessed on the
basis of its empirical usefulness, i.e. it will still need to demonstrate a novel
explanatory capability, apart from the internal logic of its argument.  This is the
subject of future work.  The brief application of this approach to the South African
case is similarly preliminary and cursory; again this is a subject that deserves a much
more thorough treatment, both in the interest of doing justice to it and to assess the
explanatory power of the approach.   
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